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ARMY AGRICULTURE IN NEW MEXICO,I852-53

ROBERT W. FRAZER

~ILB the Mexican War was in progress, military costs could
not be a matter of major concern. Once the war ended, the return
to a peacetime basis reduced army expenses considerably below
those of the war years and no immediate and deliberate policy of
economy was adopted. At the close of the war the legal strength
of the army was fixed at 10, I 20 officers and men, a mere 702 above
prewar strength. l Although the expansion of personnel was small,
less than 7 percent, the cost of maintaining the military establishment increased enormously. Part of the increase resulted from the
obligations inherent in the acquisition of so much new territory,
part reRected the cost of establishing a large number of new military posts, and a significant portion represented the expense of
transporting supplies to the far-Rung western posts. 2
The cost of maintaining troops in the 9th Military DepartmentS
was proportionately higher than in any other department in the
United States, surprisingly great, considering the small number
of troops stationed in New Mexico. The War Department was
quite aware of the cost of operations in the far western territories.
Shortly before the war officially ended, Captain Langdon C.
Easton, quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth, estimated that the
government was paying fourteen and three-quarters cents per
pound to move stores from Fort Leavenworth to Santa Fe. 4 The
rate applied, of course, to boxes, barrels, and other containers as
well as their contents. The cost of transporting some items, notably
certain commissary stores, exceeded the value of the items several
times over. Although the rate declined somewhat from year to
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year, transportation costs were a prime object when attention
turned to the reduction of military expenses.
Because the cost of transportation was so large, the army sought
increasingly to purchase supplies locally and to encourage the New
Mexican people to produce more to sell. Even though the price
of almost everything normally purchased by the army was appreciably higher in New Mexico than at Fort Leavenworth, the saving
in transportation more than compensated for the difference. However, New Mexico at this time produced few of the quartermaster
and commissary stores required by army regulations. In its current
state of development it could expand quantity to some extent but
could do little to diversify output. Even though the variety was
limited, the military offered a market previously lacking and provided a significant stimulus to New Mexican agriculture, especially com and wheat production.
By 1851 the savings achieved by purchasing in New Mexico
were negligible, and the effect was more important to the local
economy than to the military budget. Transportation costs remained a major factor, and there was a growing belief that everything available in New Mexico-whether goods, rentals, or civilian
labor-was more expensive than it should be and therefore susceptible to appreCiable reduction. In an attempt to reduce some of the
excessive costs and to provide the essential feed for public animals,
the army turned to itself as a source of some supplies. In the older
parts of the United States post gardens had long been planted, and
a post farm had been cultivated at Fort Leavenworth with considerable success. 5 In 1847 Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup
noted that, "at most of the Western outposts a system of cultivation was adopted when the posts were first established by which
the expence of maintaining the posts was greatly reduced." He
recommended that the system be introduced at posts to be established in the newly occupied West. 6 At the New Mexican posts
there is no record of post gardens during the occupation period or
the early years after annexation; indeed, the troops stationed in
New Mexico were totally unfamiliar with the agricultural methods
(including irrigation) practiced in the Southwest.
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On January 8 Secretary of War Charles M. Conrad7 issued
General Order No.1 for 1851, an order which would be much
criticized as an attempt to turn soldiers into farmers. The order
contained two main points. First, "to promote the health of the
troops, and to reduce the expense of subsisting the army," kitchen
gardens would be cultivated at every permanent post and station
where public land was available or private land could be leased
"on reasonable terms." Enough vegetables were to be grown to supply the troops and the post hospital throughout the year. Secondly,
in the recently acquired western territory "a system of more extensive cultivation will also be commenced [by the troops] as soon
as possible" at posts designated by department commanders. The
post farms would raise "grains for bread and forage, and long
f orage. "
The order authorized "all necessary expenditures for the farm
cultivation" and instructed post commanders to "adopt all necessary measures to carry it on successfully." The products of farm
and garden which constituted a part of the ration or feed for public
animals would be purchased by the commissary and quartermaster's departments of the posts. In New Mexico they would
be paid for at the prevailing St. Louis market prices. All expenditures would be deducted from the amount received; then the remaining pront would be distributed equally among the enlisted
men at the post. The post commander would be responsible "for
any improper management, or loss not strictly unavoidable."8
Farming, therefore, was not something to be carried on when military duties permitted but was itself a military duty. Secretary
Conrad hoped that the result would be an appreciable saving to
the army and that the pront-sharing plan would make the program popular with the troops.
When Colonel John Munroe,9 commander of the 9th Military
Department, received the order toward the end of February 1851,
he apparently assumed that his department would not be expected
to participate in the farm program and so addressed himself only
to the matter of kitchen gardens. Even in this he saw no great
urgency because there were "difficulties attendant on a proper
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compliance with the order," not all of which could be removed
without some reorganization of the department. Virtually all of
the troops occupied rented facilities located in towns and not
within convenient distance of land available to them for cultivation. Munroe offered a deceptively simple solution: move the
troops to locations where land was available and establish new
posts. Once the army was in its own posts there would still remain
two problems not encountered in the East. Irrigation systems
would have to be constructed and most of the garden seeds would
have to be imported from the United States. The picture thus
painted seemed to offer no insuperable difficulties and implied a
saving in expenses-an appealing thought to an economy-minded
War Department.
Analyzing the existing distribution of troops from a militaryagricultural point of view, Munroe believed that ten of the eleven
lQ
existing posts were properly positioned and that if the government decided to replace them, the new posts should be in the
same general areas. l l Having expressed his opinion on the feasibility of the agricultural program, Munroe did nothing to implement the order at any of the existing posts. This had the effect
of delaying its application in the department for one year. Munroe's belief that farming was not practical at the existing posts had
much to justify it; but at most of them, gardens were entirely possible, particularly as the leasing of land had been authorized.
, On March 29, 1851, Colonel Edwin Vose SumnerI2 was instructed to proceed to New Mexico and assume command of the
department. His attention was called particularly to the order
regarding agriculture, which he was "specially directed to carry
into immediate and it is hoped successful operation."la He was
further enjoined to "use every effort to reduce the enormous expenditures of the army in New Mexico, particularly in the quartermaster's and subsistence departments ... [and to] rigidly enforce
all regulations having reference to the economy of the service."14
Sumner left Fort Leavenworth on May 26 with a detachment of
dragoon and infantry recruits. He also took with him four young
civilians-three farmers and a machinist-each employed at sixty-
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five dollars per month, plus a ration. He justified the somewhat
unusual outlay on the ground that he had a number of large farms
to establish and operate "by a system of cultivation altogether
new" to New Mexico; that is, by the farming methods of the
well-watered East. The three farmers, with their practical knowledge, would provide the troops with an example of proper agricultural practices. 15
The agricultural program, although its objectives were laudable,
was ill-conceived in Washington and carried out in ignorance in
New Mexico. No attempt was made to determine in advance
what would grow, given the conditions of climate and soil in
New Mexico. Sumner's three farmers were not experienced in
the practice of agriculture in the arid Southwest. Other than irrigation, which he admitted was necessary, Sumner considered the
farming methods of the New Mexicans execrable. He issued instructions not to permit the Spanish-Americans hired to work
on government farms to use "their miserable method of cultivation except in irrigation, about which they know more than
we do."16
Munroe had done nothing· to prepare for the agricultural experiment, and Sumner arrived too late in the season to get it underway until the following year. He arrived in Santa Fe on July 19
and immediately embarked on the .reorganization of the department, which meant abandoning almost all of the existing posts
and establishing new posts away from centers of population. In
selecting sites for the new posts, the availability of sufficient land
and water for agriculture was a prerequisite. Furthermore, Sumner made his attitude quite clear and completely official in a department order: "No officer will be entrusted in command of a
post in this Department who does not manifest zeal and ability
in carrying out the orders of the government, relating to agriculture and the reduction of army expenses."17
The results of the program varied from post to post and were
most nearly successful, in quantity produced though not in saving, at Fort Union. ls There the farm was located on Ocate Creek,
an affluent of the Canadian River, where it emerged from the
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mountains some twenty-three miles by road north of the fort. The
land was good; the setting in the foothills of the Sangre de Cristos,
picturesque. The property was rented from Manuel Alvarez; and
even after farming was discontinued, the army paid him a small
sum annually for the privilege of cutting grass on his land. Soldiers
who served at Fort Union remembered the Ocate; a number of
them sought to purchase or rent land there, but Alvarez rejected
all offers.19
The Fort Union farm was under the supervision of W. Reuben
Sumner, one of the colonel's imported agriculturalists. Six soldiers
were regularly kept at work on the farm, plus detachments of
extra duty men cutting hay.20 In 1852 the farm yielded one thousand bushels of com, six hundred of which had already been consumed or allocated by the first of December, and forty tons of
cornstalk fodder. The soldiers also put up forty tons of hay, "more
or less," cut from the natural grass. In addition to the quartermaster's mules and horses which were grazed at the farm, there
were forty-seven work oxen, five milk cows, a breeding stallion,
and forty hogs. Not enough was raised to feed this assortment of
animals through the winter, to say nothing of the dragoon mounts
at the fort. Major James H. Carleton,21 in command of Fort Union,
recommended that the hogs be sold or even given away "to improve the breed of hogs in this country" because they were too
poor to kill and too expensive to keep. He also suggested that the
number of work oxen at the farm be reduced. 22
At Fort Conrad,23 located on the west bank of the Rio Grande
about twenty-five miles below Socorro, despite Sumner's insistence, neither a farm nor garden was planted in the spring of 1852
because an acequia had not been dug. This was particularly annoying to Sumner because he had given Major Marshal S. Howe,24
who commanded the post, permission to hire a foreman and ten
laborers to open up the farm. He also suggested that it be located
close to the river where the banks were low, whether near the
post or not, thereby avoiding the eJl."}Jense of constructing a long
acequia. If Howe could not do that, he was "to endeavor to have
some large fields," on rented land if necessary, provided the terms
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were reasonable. Sumner made it clear that he intended Howe
to produce large crops of corn, wheat, and barley despite any difficulties he might encounter. When all urging failed to move
Howe, Sumner demanded to know whether it would be possible
to plant a garden on the river bank near the post "so as to water
it by hand" and raise some late vegetables. Under pressure, Howe
finally had the garden planted and announced, presumably as a
palliative, that his men had put up some two hundred tons of
hay.25 This did not satisfy Sumner, who had no intention of letting a second year pass without a farm at Fort Conrad. He now
ordered "a detail of one officer, two noncommissioned officers, and
twenty privates ... placed on extra duty for the purpose of opening an acequia and breaking up land for a farm."26
Before Fort Fillmore27 was established on the east bank of the
Rio Grande about seven miles south of the recently settled Las
Cruces, Major Gouverneur Morris 28 objected strongly to the proposed site. He had learned "from personal inspection, and information derived from the old inhabitants of the country," that the
entire valley south of Dona Ana was subject to overflow. This, he
predicted, would interfere with communications, render the land
useless for agriculture, and probably make the site unhealthful.
Moreover, the land upstream from the site was lower than the
site itself so that it would be necessary to construct an acequia six
miles long to irrigate farm and garden. Morris discovered also
that "every portion and parcel of the soil is so perfectly saturated
with saline matter called by the Mexicans 'Tequesquite' and
salitre" that he doubted its suitability for cultivation. 29
Lieutenant Colonel Dixon S. Miles,30 who replaced Morris in
command of Fort Fillmore i~ November, warned that it would
be a waste of labor and seed to attempt to farm by methods familiar in the States and requested permission to hire an overseer
and ten Spanish-American laborers who would be familiar with
"the making and management of acequias" and "the time and
manner of planting." He estimated that the cost of the farm for
1852, exclusive of farm implements and seeds, would be $4,75°.
For this outlay he predicted that he would raise crops valued at
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$12,762, St. Louis prices. To be planted were corn, barley, oats,
beans, fodder, hay, and "pumpkins sufficient to feed horses and
cows all winter." With surprising enthusiasm, he stated that
"the reserve of this Fort is peculiarly adapted for the cultivation
of every thing." That being the case, he proposed, in addition to
the farm, to plant ten-acre gardens for each company and the post
hospital, thus raising all the vegetables necessary for the garrison.
Sumner, always suspicious of requests for civilian labor, authorized the hiring of a foreman and two laborers, for a total of not
more than $175 per month. He later relented and permitted Miles
to employ "a few Mexicans for farm labor" if he thought it would
increase production.31
In view of Miles' predictions and Sumner's concessions, the
results must be adjudged a minor tragedy. By midsummer Miles
became disenchanted with the entire project. "I never before
laboured on anything in my life with more zeal, or determination
to succeed, than this farming," he wrote; "I regret to say, I have
failed in making soldiers farmers!" The farm, it seems, had been
under water much of the time, requiring constant ditching, "leg
deep in mud." Sumner's reaction was predictable: "whenever it
is known that the govt. will not entrust any officer with the command of a frontier post, who does not cultivate a farm, there will
be no difficulty in making soldiers, farmers."32 On July 20 "the
river suddenly fell," leaving the acequias choked with mud. Spanish-Americans were hired to clean them out and the water was
Rowing again within two days.33 Despite all of the labor expended,
the crops did not succeed. The beans were destroyed by an infestation of red "chintz" bugs, and only seventeen bushels were harvested. Smut appeared on the corn in September, reducing the
expected crop by more than one-half, and only twenty-eight and
one-half tons of cornstalk fodder were recovered. If anything else
was planted, it seemingly yielded nothing.
The cost of the farm had been less than anticipated, only about
$2,800, not counting implements and seeds, but the operation
still represented a loss of $840' Of course, Miles pointed out, if
New Mexican rather than St. Louis prices were applied and the
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cost of work oxen, acequias, implements, and transportation deducted, the farm would show a profit, plus the fact that it would
be in better shape for cultivation the following year. Still holding
to his original opinion, Miles insisted that "our farm, cultivated
by Mexicans ... can be made profitable. I am convinced it never
can by the use of an American force-and will be a total failure,
in the employment of soldiers."34 The farm superintendent, a Mr.
Thompson, offered to cultivate the farm in r853 with SpanishAmerican labor, using tools, seeds, and oxen furnished by the
government. In return he would sell corn and oats to the post at
twenty-five cents per bushel, beans at one dollar per bushel, and
hay and fodder at fifteen dollars per ton. 35 Although the prices
were lower than those current in St. Louis, Sumner rejected the
proposal.
At Fort Defiance,36 located in the heart of the Navajo country,
the achievements were not much greater, although a genuine
effort was made. Major Electus Backus37 planted a farm and
garden under the supervision of one of Sumner's civilian farmers,
Jonathan F. Wyatt. The procedure astonished the observant Navajos, who asked for ox-drawn plows so that they might plant larger
fields for themselves. They were probably less impressed by the
eventual results. Corn, beans, peas, cabbage, lettuce, pumpkins,
radishes, turnips, and beets were planted in the garden and on
July r promised to yield a fair crop. Onions and some other vegetables had failed, probably, Backus surmised, because the seed had
not been good. He regretted that he had no Irish potatoes to plant,
but he had planted a few hills of the native wild potatoes to learn
if they would improve by cultivation. In the farm timothy, clover,
corn, barley, and buckwheat were planted, but no wheat, which the
Navajos grew successfully, was available for seed. The clover did
not come up; the barley and timothy were doing poorly; field
mice ate part of the corn before it sprouted and were busily gnawing the plants that did come up. Only the oats looked good. 3s
Major Henry L. Kendrick,39 who replaced Backus in command
in August 18)2, confirmed what his predecessor had suspected:
the farm was a failure. On October 1, when he made the required
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report on the farm program, he stated that all of the field crops had
failed, "due in part to the Qualities of the soil and the want of
water, and in part to the field mice." In Wyatt's opinion, with
which Kendrick agreed, the soil and climate of the region were not
suitable for extensive farming. Kendrick proposed that for the
following year "all that can be done to ensure success will be tried,
but certainly the prospect is not as promising as we could wish."
He suggested that it would be desirable to experiment with the
Jerusalem artichoke, a variety of sunflower, since it would grow
well in the area and provide a satisfactory feed for public animals.
The garden, too, had done less well than expected. Several
hundred cabbages and pumpkins had been gathered, but even
more had been ruined by frost. The root crops were still in the
ground, but it was not anticipated that their yield would be large.
The experiment with wild potatoes had led to no improvement. As
elsewhere in New Mexico, large quantities of natural hay were
put up, perhaps as much as two hundred tons. 40
On New Year's Day 1852 Sumner announced that it was "indispensably necessary" to move his headquarters from Fort Union
to Albuquerque "in order to be nearer the new posts in the indian
country."41 He had already leased the property known as the
Thomas Ranch42 in the name of the United States for $400 per
year. Undoubtedly, the fact that the land had been broken the
previous fall appealed to Sumner's agricultural zeaJ.43 With the
coming of spring he had thirty acres planted as a farm and garden.
To care for this he hired a civilian gardener, who also served as his
interpreter, to whom he paid thirty dollars per month and a ration.
He also employed an undisclosed number of laborers as temporary
help. Sumner appeared to take great pride in his small agricultural
enterprise, viewing it, perhaps, as a model for his subordinates to
emulate. When he went to Santa Fe in May he left strict instructions regarding the vegetables: "do not allow anything to be
gathered by anyone but the gardner."44
Los Lunas,45 which was not intended to be a permanent post,
was not involved in the farming program, but Captain Richard S~
Ewe1l46 had his men plant a large garden on private land. When
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his company was temporarily transferred to Albuquerque in April,
he asked permission to leave at least one man at Los Lunas because
he had "a large quantity of onions, beets, & cabbages sown there"
which within a few weeks would be ready to harvest and would be
sufficient to feed his company through the winter. Other vegetables
were planted, and he hoped, if notIling more, to recover seed to
be planted the next year. Many of his men, he added, were suffering from scurvy because of a lack of vegetables. 47 Ewell apparently
enjoyed agriculture, unlike most of his fellow officers. He wro.te to
his brother: "I am delightfully fixed just now, cows, chickens; etc.,
and I make my own butter and all that sort of thing, as comfortably
as any farmer. My garden, though late, is coming on finely, with a
good prospect of onions and cabbage."48 Perhaps the fact that his
planting was voluntary and not by order was a factor.
Fort Webster,49 which was located at the old private defensive
fort at the Santa Rita copper mines, was in a poor position to engage in agriculture and too far removed from an adequate supply of
water. Nevertheless, wrote Major Gouverneur Morris, "I will
plant, and trust to the genial influence of the earth for a crop." A
month later he made a contract with civilian John Fitzgerald to
open a farm on the Rio Mimbres-where the land appeared "to
possess singular advantages for planting"-to raise vegetables and
forage for the post. 50 Sumner rejected the contract but he remembered Morris' description of the Mimbres Valley when Fort Webster was relocated there a few months later. Major Enoch Steen,51
who commanded the post in its new position, promptly proposed
that the post farm be operated by contract since it would require
"thirty-five good laborers . . . acquainted with the mode of farming in this country." Moreover, he suggested: "If I should be permitted to form this contract and fill up the Companies to Fifty
Horses each I will insure you a pretty Post and guarantee that the
Indians will both love and fear us and will not steal our stock or
that of any body else." Sounding very much like Major Howe,
Steen added, "as you are aware, soldiers are but bad farmers at
best, even in countries better adapted to cultivation than New
Mexico."52 At that time, of course, neither farm nor garden had
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been planted at Fort Webster, nor were they attempted at Fort
Marcy or Cantonment Burgwin53 in 1852.
The farm program in 1852 was not a success. Only Sumner's
thirty-acre project, carefully nurtured and cherished, achieved what
was intended of it. Sumner estimated that its products represented
a saving of $353.60 to the War Department. As an economy measure the overall program was dubious, costing more than the value
of the crops grown. In view of New Mexico's military needs, it is
difficult to justify the time spent on the project. Troops were stationed in the department for a purpose-that purpose was not to
save money. Moreover, to engage in agriculture, which many
officers considered incompatible with the function of the army,
caused dissatisfaction among Sumner's subordinates. Major Miles,
who was more outspoken than most, wrote: "the economical use of
soldiers in farming, I deem impracticable, not an officer but objects to perform such work, and uses every means to avoid it."54
Sumner's personal attitude toward the program can only be surmised. Certainly it was influenced by the fact that he was acting
under instructions, and he was always a stickler for strict compliance with orders. Having the task thrust upon him, he made
a conscientious effort to carry it out and took a perverse kind
of pride in the small success of the farm at his headquarters. Admitting that the farm program had been less efficacious than he had
anticipated, he insisted that the difficulties could be surmounted.55
The failure of military farming was not limited to New Mexico.
Secretary of War Conrad regretfully reported that at only a few
posts had it "been attended by beneficial results"; but he believed,
with "a fair trial" the outcome would be more favorable. Conversely, General Winfield Scott considered that success in military
farming was actually undesirable. It would discourage settlement
near military posts, for the settlers looked upon the posts as a
market for their products. Furthermore, troops could not carry on
their military duties and maintain discipline "if required to engage
in cultivation beyond kitchen gardens."56
Unlike the farms, the post gardens were ndt experimental, although they had not been planted before on an organized basis in
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New Mexico. Fresh vegetables, previously available only in limited quantities and variety, were considered necessary to improve
the health of the troops and highly desirable to lend zest to the
otherwise dreary ration. The post gardens did reasonably well in
New Mexico in 1852, producing, among other things, a number
of crops which could be stored for use during the winter. One of
the results was the virtual disappearance of scurvy among the
troops stationed in New Mexico, declining from 113 cases in 1851
to 19 in 1853.57
A full list of the vegetables planted by the troops cannot be compiled. In preparation for the planting season of 1853, Sumner
simply asked that an assortment of fresh garden seeds suitable for
ten companies be sent to the department. 58 A crop frequently mentioned, because it was unsuccessfully attempted at almost every
post at one time or another, was the Irish potato. Many of the
vegetables planted in post gardens had not been grown in New
Mexico prior to United States occupation. 59 Soon some of them
were planted by the New Mexicans, thus inHuencing their agriculture and eventually their diet. Even the Indians were given
seeds and induced to plant some vegetables, but whether they ate
any of the produce no one bothered to record.
In 1853 farms were planted at all of the permanent posts except
Fort Marcy. The outcome was even less satisfactory than before. At
the three posts where farms had not been attempted in 1852, the
one at Fort Webster was most nearly successful. Colonel Sumner
left no doubt of what he expected Major Steen to accomplish:
"the cultivation of a good farm by your command [is] next in
importance after the preservation of discipline at your post, and
quiet amongst the Indians." Even construction at the incomplete
post (some of the troops and the sick were still in tents) was
secondary. Be made this clear to Steen when he wrote: "If, in
addition to the above important duties, you may have time to
devote to the improvement of your quarters, no objections, of
course, will be made to your doing so; but the Col. Commdg. cannot authorize such improvements or even permit them, if they are
to interfere in any degree with your farming operations."60
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There was, in fact, considerable agricultural activity in the
vicinity of Fort Webster in the spring of 1853. A fifty-acre farm
for the Apaches was planted in corn, beans, squash, and pumpkins
under contract with Fran<;,:ois Fletcher, interpreter for the Apache
agency, who was to instruct the Indians in husbandry. Fletcher also
prepared a much larger acreage which he cultivated as a private
venture. The post farm was sown in oats and com and, as elsewhere, hay was put up from natural grass. There is no record of the
results of Fletcher's private operation; but the Indian farm produced comparatively little, largely because of neglect. The post
farm showed a deficit of $73.01, the smallest in the department. 61
At the other extreme was Fort Massachusetts,62 located at an
altitude of more than eight thousand feet in a region where killing
frost might occur even in mid-summer. Major George A. H.
Blake63 complained that he had only one experienced farmer in his
command, a noncommissioned officer whose services were difficult
to spare from other duties. Despite these handicaps, Sumner instructed Blake to obtain all necessary farming implements from
Fort Union, sending his own wagons to transport them. Sumner
also told him that he would be expected to raise most of the
grain required by his post.64
The post garden was planted in April, too early for the climate
of the area, and was largely destroyed by cold weather. The farm,
although it was not planted until May, produced something less
than a spectacular crop. Ten bushels .of barley were sown and
about thirty bushels reaped. Six bushels of wheat planted resulted
in a yield of fifteen bushels. From four acres sowed in oats, a crop
of ten bushels was recovered. Timothy and clover were sown on ten
acres but failed to corne up, and ten acres of com were killed by
frost. The closest thing to an achievement was the harvesting of
some two tons of straw, hardly a satisfactory return for the time and
labor expended. Blake could only report that because of "the shortness of the season, the farming operations cannot be successfully
continued at this post."65
The results at Fort Conrad were summed up by Colonel Joseph
K. F. Mansfield66 when he inspected the post in October:
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There is a good garden at this post and a farm had been in operation
on hired ground, where 371;2 bushels of wheat and 50 bushels of
corn were raised the past year, at a cost of 100 dollars for the use of
the farm and 102 dollars for repairs of "acequia" besides the loss of
one quartermaster's mule. In short it had proved a failure. 67

Sumner relinquished command of the department at the end of
June 1853 and consequently was not at hand to observe the results
of the second year of military farming. It was probably just as well.
Two years of agriculture had simply increased expenses in the department. Colonel Mansfield's comments on farm culture, as he
saw it in 1853, were almost uniformly discouraging. The farms at
Forts Defiance, Massachusetts, Conrad, Fillmore, and the one·· at
Albuquerque were failures. At Fort Union the farm was in debt,
but Mansfield proposed retaining the land to graze public horses
and beef cattle and cut hay. The farm at Fort Webster "looked
well," but this was faint praise as he recommended that the post
be abandoned. Only at Los Lunas, where none was required, did
the farm receive unqualified approval. Neither Fort Marcy nor
Cantonment Burgwin engaged in farming. Gardens were planted
at all ten posts, and all but two were described by Mansfield as
good or excellent. The garden at Albuquerque he termed "almost a
failure," and the one at Fort Union supplied only part of the
vegetables needed at the post.
In his closing report Mansfield concluded that the farming program in New Mexico was generally a failure:
The mode of cultivation in this Territory is necessarily so different
from that to which the American and European, who constitute the
rank and file of our army, have been accustomed, and the business so
entirely different from the pursuits of an officer and soldier, that it
is not at all astonishing it did not succeed. There are probably many
officers and soldiers too who have never had the least practice at
planting not even an ordinary garden, and certainly the subject at the
Military Academy has never been introduced as one of the essentials
of an officer in defence of his country, however pleasant and agreeable it may be to possess information and have practice in farming.
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He considered the program injurious to discipline and responsible for the neglect of other and more important duties, which, if
properly pursued, would occupy all of the time and energy of the
troops, leaving none for farming. 68 When Colonel Philip St.
George Cooke, who had succeeded to the command of Fort Union,
reported that the corn raised on the post farm in 1853 had cost the
government more than four times as much as if it had been purchased locally on the open market, the glamour of what had been
considered New Mexico's most successful military farm was sadly
tarnished. 69 Brigadier General John Garland, Sumner's successor,
simply remarked that the farm program had "failed entirely."70
In Washington there had been a change of administration, and
no one was left to urge the continuation of military farming.
Colonel Samuel Cooper, Adjutant General of the Army, reported
that by the end of the third quarter of 1853 the farm program for
the West as a whole was more than $18,000 in debt, most of which
represented the loss of $16,70 1.12 in the 9th Military Department,
exclusive of Fort Massachusetts, of which it was noted, "the Commanding officer reports the farm a complete failure." The only
post to show a profit was Fort Defiance, $682.88, which was
achieved by the "sale" of hay, most of which was natural grass
rather than a product of the farm. 71 Fort Union, with the largest
program, had the largest deficit, more than $13,5°0, and Albuquerque, of which Sumner had been so proud, had amassed an
indebtedness of $480.17 by September 30, 1853. Cooper recommended that the program be discontinued and the "implements,
cattle &c heretofore purchased" sold to recover as much of the loss
as possible. Secretary of War Jefferson Davis agreed. The farming
experiment was quietly terminated, and the sale of farm equipment
ordered. 72 There is no indication that any of the officers in New
Mexico regretted its passing.
The farm experiment had little noticeable effect on the New
Mexican economy. At none of the posts was enough grain produced to fill the needs of the post itself; hence, the army continued
to provide a market for civilian production without even an appreciable reduction in prices. Some few jobs were made available to
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civilians as fann supervisors and laborers, but under Sumner's
parsimonious administration they were held to a minimum. AngloAmerican supervisors, none of whom had significant experience
with New Mexican fanning, were employed at five of the seven
posts where fanns were required. They were paid from thirty to
sixty-five dollars per month, plus one or more rations. Aside from
the troops employed, the farm laborers were almost all SpanishAmericans and varied in numbers literally from one day to the
next. They were employed only for about one-half of the year and
received twenty-five to fifty cents per day. Post gardens undoubtedly made a greater impact. Even the one at Fort Massachusetts produced some vegetables in 1853. While they lessened the
anny's dependence on local civilian produce, most of the vegetables
raised in post gardens, with the exception of onions and beans,
were not crops ordinarily planted by the New Mexicans. The
result was more diversification of production than competition
with native growers.

NOTES
I. Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1853, 33rd Cong., 1St sess.,
H. R. Exec. Doc. I, II, II.
2. Charles M. Conrad to Millard Fillmore, Nov. 30, 1850, and "Statement of Current Expenses," 31st Cong., 2nd sess., Sen. Exec. Doc. I, II, 8~,
122.
3. The 9th Military Department was created on Nov. 3, 1846. On
Oct. 31, 1853, it became the Department of New Mexico.
4. Henry P. Walker, The Wagonmasters (Norman, 1966), p. 230.
5. Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1852, 32nd Cong., 2nd
sess., H. R. Exec. Doc. I, II, 4.
At Fort Leavenworth some civilian farmers were regularly employed.
See Francis Paul Prucha, ed., Army Life on the Western Frontier (Norman, 1958), pp. 85, 88.
6. Thomas S. Jesup, Dec. 22, 1847, Record Group (RG) 94, Adjutant
General's Office (AGO), Letters Received (LR), National Archives (NA).
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George Gibson, Commissary General of Subsistence, concurred in Jesup's
report.
7. Conrad, a native of Virginia, was Secretary of War in President
Millard Fillmore's cabinet. He had no military background.
8. Jan. 8, 1851, 32nd Cong., 1st sess., H. R. Exec. Doc. 2, pp. 164-65.
9. Munroe was major and brevet colonel, 2nd Artillery. He became
commander of the 9th Military Department on Oct. 23, 1849.
.
10. The posts in the department at this time were Las Vegas, Rayado,
Taos, Abiquiu, Santa Fe (Fort Marcy), Albuquerque, Cebolleta, Socorro,
Dona Ana, El Paso (Coons' Ranch), and San Elizario. Munroe recommended that the post of Socorro be moved to Valverde.
I I. Munroe to Roger Jones, Mar~ 30, 1851, RG 94, AGO, LR, NA.
The report did not reach Washington until May 6, more than a month
after Conrad had issued instructions to Munroe's successor.
12. Sumner was lieutenant colonel and brevet colonel, 1st Dragoons.
He had previously been briefly in New Mexico, serving under Brigadier
General Stephen Watts Kearny in the Mexican War.
13. Jones to Sumner, Mar. 29, 1851, RG 98, Records of United States
Army Commands (USAC), Department of New Mexico (DNM), LR, NA.
14. Conrad to Sumner, April I, 1851, 32nd Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Exec.
Doc. I, pp. 125-26.
15. Sumner to Jones, Oct. 28, 1851, RG 98, USAC, DNM, Letters
Sent (LS), NA.
16. Sumner to Dixon S. Miles, Mar. 30, 1852, RG 98, USAC, DNM,
LS,NA.
17.0. No.6, Jan. 9,1852, RG 98, USAC, Orders, 9th Mil. Dept., NA.
18. Fort Union was established on July 26, 1851, in the valley of Wolf
Creek, an afHuent of the Mora River, about twenty-four miles northeast of
Las Vegas.
19. At least three such offers were made in 1856, the year of Alvarez'
death. On the back of one of them Alvarez wrote that he was even then
making arrangements to rent the land to Captain William Shoemaker,
ordnance officer at Fort Union. B. Marchowich to Alvarez, Jan. II, 1856,
and note v., Alvarez Papers, State of New Mexico Records Center, Santa
Fe.
20. James H. Carleton to Sumner, Aug. 2, 1852, RG 98, USAC,
DMN,LR,NA.
21. Carleton was captain and brevet major, 1st Dragoons.
22. Carleton to Samuel D. Sturgis, Dec. 2, 1852, RG 98, USAC,
DNM,LR,NA.
23. Fort Conrad was established on Sept. 8, 1851. It was named for
the Secretary of War.

FRAZER: ARMY AGRICULTURE

331

24. Howe was major, 2nd Dragoons.
25. John C. McFerran to Howe, Dec. 6, 1851, RG 98, USAC, Fort
Conrad, LR, NA; Sumner to Lawrence P. Graham, Feb. 26, 1852, RG 98,
USAC, DNM, LS, NA; Sumner to Howe, Mar. 30, 1852, and June 7,
1852, RG 98, USAC, DNM,LS, NA; Howe to Sumner, RG 98, Sept. 10,
1852, USAC, DNM, LR, NA.
26. S.O. No. 67, Nov. 12, 1852, RG 98, USAC, Special Orders, 9th
Mil. Dept., NA.
27. Fort Fillmore was established on Sept. 23, 1851.
28. Morris was major, 3rd Infantry. When he was ordered to establish Fort Webster later in the year, he was replaced at Fort Fillmore by
Lieutenant Colonel Dixon S. Miles, 3rd Infantry.
29. Morris to Sumner, Aug. 27, 1851, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LR,
NA. There are two pertinent letters of this date.
30. Miles was also charged with transportation to, and supplies for,
Fort Webster, emphasizing the need for adequate stores at Fort Fillmore.
O. No. 44, Dec. 2, 1851, RG 98, USAC, Orders, 9th Mil. Dept., NA.
31. Miles to McFerran, Nov. 29, 1851, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LR,
NA; Sumner to Miles, Dec. 3, 1851, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LS, NA.
32. Miles to AAAG, Santa Fe, July 31, 1852, and Sumner endorsement, Aug. 27,1852, RG98, USAC, DNM, LR, NA.
33. Miles to AAAG, Santa Fe, Aug. I, 1852, RG 98, USAC, DNM,
LE., NA.
34. Miles.to Cooper, Nov. 10, 1852, and "Statement of Expenditures
and receipts of the Farm Cultivated at Fort Fillmore N. M. up to 31st
October 1852, by 1st Lieut J. C. McFerran," RG 98, USAC, DNM, LR,
NA. The "chintz" bugs may have been red spiders.
35. [Proposal of Mr. Thompson] encl. in Miles to AAAG, Santa Fe,
Aug. I, 1852, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LR, NA.
36. Fort Defiance was established Sept. 18, 1851. It was located on
Black Creek at the mouth of Canoncito Bonito, northwest of Gallup, New
Mexico, in the present Arizona.
37. Backus was major, 3rd Infantry.
38. Backus to Jones, July I, 1852, RG 98, USAC, DNM, Unentered
LR,NA.
39. Kendrick was captain and brevet major, 2nd Artillery. He served
in New Mexico until 1857 when he was appointed professor of chemistry,
geology, and mineralogy at the United States Military Academy.
40. Kendrick to [Jones], Oct. I, 1852, RG 98, USAC, DNM, Unentered LR, NA; Kendrick to Sumner, Sept. 10, 1852, RG 98, USAC,
DNM,LR,NA.
41. Sumner to Jones, Jan. I, 1852, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LS, NA.
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42. The Thomas Ranch was property purchased by 1st Lieutenant
Francis ]. Thomas, 3rd Artillery, and Richard H. Weightman, additional
paymaster, volunteers, from Rafael and Manuel Armijo on April 25, 1849.
Bernalillo County, Deed Book A, State of New Mexico Records Center.
43. Henry Winslow to Sumner, Dec. 23, 1851, RG 98, USAC, DNM,
LR, NA; Sumner with A. J. Pillings, agent of Alexander W. Reynolds
and William McGrorty, Dec. 28, 1851, RG 92, Records of the Office of
the Quartermaster General, Register of Contracts,NA.
44. Sumner to Daniel H. Rucker, May 3,1852, RG 98, USAC, DNM,
LS,NA.
45. Los Lunas, located on rented property in the town of the same
name, was established on Jan. 3, 1852. It was intended as a temporary
station but it was not finally broken up until Sept. 6, 1860.
46. Ewell was captain, 1st Dragoons.
47. Ewell to McFerran, May 7, 1852, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LR,
NA.
'
48. Ewell to Ben [Ewell], July 21, 1852, The Making of a Soldier:
Letters of General R. S. Ewell, Percy Gatling Hamlin, ed. (Richmond,
Va., 1935), p. 75·
49. Fort Webster was established under that name in Dec., 1851. O.
No. 44, Dec. 2, 1851, RG 98, USAC, Orders, 9th Mil. Dept., DNM,
NA. The old private defensive post had been occupied previously by the
escort to the boundary commission under the name Cantonment Dawson.
On Sept. 9, 1852, Fort Webster was moved to the Mimbres Valley, about
fourteen miles northeast of the copper mines. It was named for Secretary
of State Daniel Webster.
50. Morris to McFerran, Mar. 16, 1852, and Apr. 13, 1852, RG 98,
USAC, DNM, LR, NA.
5I. Steen was captain and brevet major, 2nd Dragoons.
52. Steen to Sumner, Dec. 13, 1852, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LR, NA.
53. Cantonment Burgwin was established Aug. 14, 1852. It was located on the Rio Grande del Rancho about ten miles south of Taos. It was
intended to be a temporary post and was abandoned on May 18, 1860.
It was named for Captain John H. K. Burgwin, 1st Dragoons, killed during the Taos uprising of 1847.
54- Miles to AAAG, Santa Fe, Aug. I, 1852, RG 98, USAC, DNM,
LR, NA.
55. Sumner to [Cooper], Sept. 24, 1852, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LS,
NA.
56. Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1852, 32nd Cong., 2nd
sess., H. R. Exec. Doc. I, II, 4, 35.
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57. Richard H. Coolidge, comp., Statistical Report of the Sickness
and Mortality in the Army of the United States [1839-55] (Washington,
1856), p. 4 2 9.
58. Sumner to George G. Waggaman, Dec. 15, 1852, RG 98, USAC,
DNM,LS,NA.
59. The Santa Fe Republican, Sept. 17, 1847, recommended "that
persons with suitable land plant vegetables to sell to the army. Irish potatoes are the first, then cabbage, beets, radishes, lettuce, sweet potatoes,
turnips, cucumbers, etc."
60. Sturgis to Steen, Jan. 26, 1853, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LS, NA.
61. William Carr Lane contract with Fletcher, April 7, 1853, and
Jam~s M. Smith to David Meriwether, Sept. 5, 1853, RG 75, Office
of Indian Affairs, New Mexico Superintendency, LR, Microcopy 234,
Reel 546, NA.
62. Fort Massachusetts was established on June 22, 1852. It was located in a, sheltered valley on Ute Creek, about six miles north of the
present town of Fort Garland, Colorado.
63. Blake was major, 1st Dragoons.
64. Blake to Sumner, May I, 1853, RG gS, USAC, DNM, LR, NA;
Sturgis to Blake, Jan. 26, 1853, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LS, NA.
65. Blake to Cooper, Oct. I, 1853, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LR, NA.
66. Mansfield was colonel, Inspector General's Department. He conducted a general inspection of the 9th Mil. Dept. in Aug.-Oct., 1853.
67. Robert W. Frazer, ed., Mansp,eld on the Condition of the Western
Forts, 1853-54 (Norman, 1963), p. 51.
68. Ibid., pp. 62-64. As there were no profits to distribute to the soldiers
who had worked on the farms, Mansfield suggested that they be given
extra duty pay, then 15 cents per day.
69. Cooke to Nichols, Jan. 20, 1854, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LR, NA.
Cooke was lieutenant colonel and brevet colonel, 2nd Dragoons.
70. Garland to Lorenzo Thomas, Oct. 29,1853, RG 98, USAC, DNM,
LS, NA. Garland was colonel, 8th Infantry, and brevet brigadier general.
71. It is interesting to note that after the farm program had been
terminated 1st Lieutenant John C. McFerran, commissary of subsistence at
Fort Fillmore, reported that after all expenses of the post farm had been
paid there was a surplus of "at least $1500." McFerran to William H.
Wood, May 1,1854, RG 98, USAC, DNM, LR, NA.
72. Cooper to Davis, Jan. 26, 1854, and Davis endorsement, Feb. 9,
1854, RG 94, AGO, LR, NA; G.O. No. 3, Feb. 9, '1854, RG 94, AGO,
General Orders, Headquarters Army, NA.
Elsewhere in the West, farms were cultivated at eleven posts, exclusive of
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the long-established farm at Fort Leavenworth. At only two posts, both in
Minnesota, was there a profit, at one as a result of renting the farm to a
civilian, at the other from the sale of hay.

